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means that, like emergencies, environmental issues pose a fundamental challenge for the rule of law: They
reveal the necessity of unconstrained executive discretion. Discretion is widely lamented as a fundamental
flaw in Canadian environmental law, which undermines both environmental protection and the rule of law
itself. Through the conceptual framework of the environmental emergency, this article offers a critique of the
current understanding of discretion in environmental law and suggests how an alternative conception of the
rule of law can both constitute and constrain the state’s regulative authority over the environment.
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The Environmental Emergency and the
Legality of Discretion in Environmental
Law
JOCELYN STACEY*
This article argues that environmental issues confront us as an ongoing emergency.
The epistemic features of serious environmental issues – the fact that we cannot
reliably distinguish ex ante between benign policy choices and choices that may lead to
environmental catastrophe – are the same features of an emergency. This means that, like
emergencies, environmental issues pose a fundamental challenge for the rule of law: They
reveal the necessity of unconstrained executive discretion. Discretion is widely lamented as
a fundamental flaw in Canadian environmental law, which undermines both environmental
protection and the rule of law itself. Through the conceptual framework of the environmental
emergency, this article offers a critique of the current understanding of discretion in
environmental law and suggests how an alternative conception of the rule of law can both
constitute and constrain the state’s regulative authority over the environment.
Cet article prétend que les problèmes environnementaux nous assaillent à la manière
d’une urgence renouvelée. Le caractère épistémique des problèmes environnementaux
graves – le fait que nous ne puissions faiblement distinguer ex ante entre des choix bénins
de politiques et des choix susceptibles de mener à une catastrophe environnementale – a
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la même valeur que celui d’une urgence. Il en ressort que, tout comme les urgences, les
problèmes environnementaux représentent une difficulté fondamentale pour la primauté du
droit : ils soulignent la nécessité d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire sans contrainte. On déplore
largement le fait que l’absence de pouvoir discrétionnaire représente un vice fondamental
des lois canadiennes sur l’environnement, qui sape tant la protection de l’environnement
que la primauté du droit elle-même. En analysant le cadre conceptuel de l’urgence
environnementale, cet article apporte une critique de l’interprétation actuelle du pouvoir
discrétionnaire des lois sur l’environnement et suggère un moyen par lequel une nouvelle
conception de la primauté du droit pourrait à la fois conditionner et contraindre le pouvoir
régulateur de l’État sur l’environnement.
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“Our planet’s health and its capacity to function for the journey through time are
now deeply imperilled. We stand on the edge of climate catastrophe.”1
FOR DECADES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SCHOLARS have grappled with the

apparent limits of law in improving environmental protection. Scholars offer a
wide variety of explanations for the perceived impotence of environmental law
ranging from its anthropocentric character2 to its lack of reflexivity3 or, more
1.
2.
3.

David Spratt & Philip Sutton, Climate Code Red: The Case for Emergency Action (Victoria,
AUS: Scribe Publications, 2008) at 144.
Jane Holder, “New Age: Rediscovering Natural Law” (2000) 53:1 Curr Legal
Probs 151 at 166-67.
Eric W Orts, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89:4 Nw U L Rev 1227; Andreas
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Towards a Critical Environmental Law” in Andreas
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ed, Law and Ecology: New Environmental Foundations (New
York: Routledge, 2011) 18.
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generally, to its immaturity.4 One leading environmental law scholar describes
environmental law as “hot law” because it concerns situations in which “the agreed
frames, legal and otherwise, for how we understand and act in the world are in
a constant state of flux and contestation.”5 This article takes up the challenge of
understanding both the promise and limits of law in governing the environment.
Its central argument is that the challenge environmental issues pose for law is
best understood as the same challenge that emergencies pose for law. This is
because, like emergencies, environmental issues require decisions to be taken
under conditions of profound epistemic frailty, where the chance of catastrophe
cannot be reliably eliminated in advance.
The specific context of the article is administrative law, which covers
a vast range of environmental decision making in Canada. Understanding
environmental issues as an ongoing emergency offers a novel and comprehensive
perspective on both environmental decision makers and the institutions that
oversee the exercise of their administrative authority. Administrative law
requirements are a primary concern of many Canadian environmental law
scholars who are rightly apprehensive about the use of administrative discretion to
undermine environmental protection. Approaching environmental law from the
emergency perspective reveals that existing accounts have identified the symptom
(discretion) without yet fully confronting the much deeper theoretical problem
that environmental issues pose for governing through law. This article advances
an understanding of the rule of law—one built on common law reasoning—
that is capable of providing meaningful legal constraints on environmental
decision making.
The account of environmental law offered in this article—an account of
the “environmental emergency”—emerges from environmental thinking itself.
Environmentalists are often accused of being “alarmists,”6 “doomsayers,”7
4.

5.

6.

7.

Elizabeth Fisher et al, “Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental
Law Scholarship” (2009) 21:2 J Envtl L 213 (discussing the perceived immaturity of
environmental law); D Paul Emond, “‘Are We There Yet?’: Reflections on the Success of the
Environmental Law Movement in Ontario” (2008) 46:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 219 at 222.
Elizabeth Fisher, “Environmental Law as ‘Hot’ Law” (2013) 25:3 J Envtl L 347 at 347-48
[citations omitted] [Fisher, “‘Hot’ Law”]. See also Michael M’Gonigle & Paula Ramsay,
“Greening Environmental Law: From Sectoral Reform to Systemic Re-Formation” (2004) 14
J Envtl L & Prac 333.
Bjorn Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming (New
York: Alfred A Knopf, 2007). Lomborg calls the language in the epigraph “catastrophespeak”
and argues that this “hyperbole” inhibits “a sensible dialogue on the political and economic
arguments for action” (ibid at 128, 130-31).
Frank B Cross, “The Naïve Environmentalist” (2002) 53:2 Case W Res L Rev 477 at 478.
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“radicals,”8 and “extremists”9 in the increasingly polarized debates surrounding
serious environmental issues. The “carbon bomb”10 has replaced the notorious
“population bomb,”11 and, as reflected in the epigraph, current environmental
‘alarmists’ are now fixated on catastrophic climate change. The language of
environmental catastrophe is often grounded in genuinely perceived threats,
but it is also often used as a deliberate strategy to mobilize a complacent public
and push for environmental reform. This article argues that it is worth taking
these claims seriously—not because they are necessarily correct nor to provoke
political action—but for the purpose of better understanding how environmental
decisions can be made in accordance with principles of a democratic society
governed by the rule of law. For this reason, the concept of the environmental
emergency should be of interest to environmental law scholars and to public law
scholars more generally. Not only does this framework offer insight into existing
approaches in Canadian environmental law, it also shows that environmental
issues—like emergencies—can force us to re-examine our “agreed legal frames.”12
The environmental emergency has important implications for understanding
how creative institutional design can allow for the realization of the rule of law in
complex decision-making contexts.
The article proceeds in three main parts. Part I makes the argument that
environmental issues can be understood as constituting an ongoing emergency,
from the perspective of the challenge they pose for the rule of law. The problem
emergencies pose for the rule of law is fundamental and, unlike most topics
in environmental law, has a long history in political and legal theory. At its
most basic, the emergency is a sudden and extreme event, defined here as an
unforeseeable, extreme threat.13 I argue that environmental issues possess these
constitutive features due to their complexity and indeterminacy, and thus pose
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

Joe Oliver, “An open letter from Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver,” The Globe and Mail
(9 January 2012), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/an-open-letter-fromnatural-resources-minister-joe-oliver/article4085663> (comments by Joe Oliver, then Federal
Minister of Natural Resources, in anticipation of the Joint Review Panel on the Northern
Gateway Pipeline).
“How To Spot An Environmental Extremist,” Ethical Oil (27 September 2011), online:
<www.ethicaloil.org/news/how-to-spot-an-environmental-extremist>.
“Carbon bomb” refers specifically to Alberta’s oil sands. See Elizabeth McGowan, “U.S.
Climate Protests Shift to Blocking Keystone XL Pipeline Approval,” Reuters (27 June 2011)
online: <www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/27/idUS323166223820110627> (quoting
Bill McKibben).
Paul R Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968).
Fisher, “‘Hot’ Law,” supra note 5.
See Part I(A), below.
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the same kind of challenge to the rule of law. The problem of emergencies—
including the environmental emergency—is that their unforeseeable and
potentially catastrophic nature seemingly necessitates unconstrained executive
discretion. This key observation is at odds with a position taken by many legal
scholars seeking to enhance environmental protection in Canada. I refer to this
as the environmental reform position and argue that it portrays administrative
discretion as inherently objectionable—not only a threat to environmental
protection, but also a threat to the rule of law itself.
Part II of the article builds on the emergency framework to diagnose the
‘problem’ of discretion identified by the environmental reform position. In
this section, I argue that emergencies prompt us to reconsider our most basic
assumptions about law, discretion, and what it means to govern in accordance
with the rule of law. I use Carl Schmitt’s challenge, the challenge to show how
emergencies can be governed by law, as a starting point for unpacking the core
assumptions about the ability of law to constrain emergency powers.14 I argue
that the emergency challenge is to a formal conception of the rule of law, which
presumes that the legislature is the only legitimate source of legal norms and is
therefore undermined by executive discretion. In order to preserve the formal
conception, judges, when faced with the exercise of discretionary authority,
will create either “legal black holes” or “legal grey holes,” where discretion is
governed by the rule of law only in the thinnest sense of formal compliance with
validly enacted legislation.15 Using these concepts of legal black and grey holes, I
demonstrate the persistence of the formal conception in Canadian environmental
law, which validates the environmental reform position’s concern that discretionary
environmental decisions are not subject to robust legal constraints.
In Part III, I canvas possible responses to the environmental emergency.
I first address the solutions that follow from the environmental reform position—
stricter ex ante legal rules and delegation to an independent expert decision
maker. But since these solutions are also products of the formal conception of
the rule of law, we will see that they cannot offer a solution to the environmental
reform position’s concern. I then introduce an account of common law
constitutionalism, which understands rule-of-law constraints as “the constraints
of adequate justification.”16 Common law constitutionalism suggests that creative
14. David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006). [Dyzenhaus, Constitution].
15. Ibid.
16. David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture”
(1998) 14:1 SAJHR 11 at 30 [Dyzenhaus, “Justification”].
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institutional design can allow all public decisions to be subject to meaningful
rule-of-law constraints, even in the highly complex and unpredictable context of
the environmental emergency.

I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY
This section introduces the argument that the challenge that environmental issues
pose to law is best understood as the challenge of emergencies. By “environmental
emergency,” I do not mean any event or series of events—extreme weather,
earthquakes, or the like—since these are emergencies in a conventional sense.
Rather, this section argues that the core problem of (conventional) emergencies
focuses our attention on the systemic features of environmental issues that emerge
from the complex, adaptive nature of ecological systems. Before undertaking this
argument, however, I will first set out the constitutive features of emergencies
and introduce the challenge they pose to the rule of law, which sets the stage for
the argument that follows. Relying on an example of an unprecedented insect
epidemic in Western Canada, I then argue that these emergency features inhere
in environmental issues as well. In the last section, I show that this concept of
the environmental emergency conflicts with a dominant position in Canadian
environmental law: the environmental reform position.
A. THE EMERGENCY FRAMEWORK

Emergencies, in particular national security emergencies, have moved to the centre
stage of public law post-September 11 (“9/11”).17 This literature is extensive. It
addresses numerous vexed questions concerning both the controversial substance
of emergency response powers and the challenge of ensuring that the exercise
of these powers remains subject to meaningful rule-of-law constraints, such as
due process.18 Much of this literature has been framed explicitly in response to a
controversial legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, who wrote in the Weimar period

17. Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?” (2003) 112:5 Yale LJ 1011 at 1014.
18. For an excellent cross-section of these debates, see Victor V Ramraj, ed, Emergencies and the
Limits of Legality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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but whose work has again risen to prominence in the contemporary
emergency literature.19
Schmitt argues that the emergency cannot be governed by law. He describes
the emergency as an unforeseeable, existential threat that cannot be anticipated in
law.20 Schmitt maintains that the emergency reveals the necessity of unconstrained
executive discretion, since the emergency and its response cannot be anticipated
through positive legal norms.21 Where the state faces a truly existential threat,
Schmitt argues that the sovereign (or the modern-day executive) may need to
suspend legal order altogether,22 but the fact that the sovereign is so empowered
reveals that it is in the position to respond the most expeditiously to serious,
though not existential, threats.23 In the face of an unforeseeable and extreme
emergency, Schmitt argues, the sovereign can do whatever is necessary to bring
the crisis to an end; executive discretion cannot be constrained by law.
Schmitt’s work, though extreme and unsettling for most legal scholars,
seemed to offer an explanation for the sweeping executive action taken by the
United States in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.24 The challenge for most
legal scholars writing after 9/11 was to show that the American emergency
response was not, as Schmitt would have predicted, inevitable. They sought to
show that Schmitt was wrong in his assumptions about law and its ability to
constrain emergency power.25 Schmitt’s question, then, is a question of the first
19. David Dyzenhaus, “The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers be
Normalized?” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The Security of
Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001)
21 at 22; Bruce Ackerman, “The Emergency Constitution” (2004) 113:5 Yale LJ 1029;
Sanford Levinson, “Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency” (2005) 40:3
Ga L Rev 699 at 706, 721-22; Eric A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Posner & Vermeule, Terror]; Gross, supra
note 17 at 1038-39.
20. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by
George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985) at 6.
21. Ibid at 6-7.
22. Ibid at 12.
23. See Eric A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010) at 32-33.
24. The President of the United States declared a state of emergency and authorized indefinite
detention at Guantanamo Bay, ‘advanced interrogation tactics,’ and warrantless spying all
initially through unilateral executive action. See Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative
Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 4.
25. David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 34-35, 40 [Dyzenhaus, Constitution]; Ackerman, supra
note 19; Levinson, supra note 19.
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order. Simply put, there is no point in debating the appropriateness of particular
legal measures in times of crisis if Schmitt is correct that emergency powers
cannot be governed by law.
While Schmitt’s argument about the rule of law is controversial, his definition
of the emergency is not. Constitutional law scholars accept the basic terms of
Schmitt’s challenge: to show how law can govern the response to an extreme and
unforeseeable threat.26 The core challenge posed by an emergency arises from two
epistemic features: that is, a lack of ex ante knowledge about the specific events
that may produce an emergency and a lack of ex ante knowledge about how to
respond to such an unforeseen event. These features can arise when the state faces
a political or national security threat—as Schmitt claims—but, as we will see,
these features inhere in environmental issues as well.
B. THE CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

The argument that the key emergency features inhere in environmental issues
follows, in short, from the current scientific understanding of ecological systems
as complex, adaptive systems. Ecosystems are comprised of myriad intricate and
indeterminate relationships between humans, plants, animals, and the abiotic
components of the environment, such as the climate. These relationships are
themselves adaptive, or changing over time, which makes predicting the impacts
of our actions on the environment extremely difficult. Complex, adaptive systems
are characterized by two phenomena. The first is indeterminacy,27 or the fact
that ecosystems are comprised of non-linear dynamics, which are vastly different
than the direct, linear and causal linkages that can be determined in a scientific

26. If anything, constitutional law scholars have relaxed the threshold for what constitutes an
emergency. Schmitt focused on a truly existential threat, but the prevalence of Schmitt’s
challenge in the post-9/11 literature suggests that something less than an existential threat
can constitute an emergency, given that, as dramatic as terror attacks of the last two decades
have been, they have not been existential threats. Furthermore, the basic problem that
emergencies pose for law can be traced back to John Locke’s Second Treatise. See John Locke,
The Second Treatise of Government (An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End
of Civil Government) and A Letter Concerning Toleration (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966)
at 81-82 (ss 159-60). See also Gross, supra note 17 (offers a nice overview of how a core
understanding of the emergency permeates political and legal theory).
27. Brian Wynne, “Uncertainty and Environmental Learning” (1992) 2:2 Global Envtl
Change 111 at 114.
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laboratory.28 In fact, their relationships are so complex they are incompressible,
meaning that the “simplest model is the process itself ” and “[t]he only way to
determine the future of the system is to run it: there are no shortcuts.”29 Even
when ecological relationships are well understood, the most minuscule errors
in measurement can cause drastically inaccurate predictions because of the
non-linear dynamics of the system.30 The second phenomenon is the relatively
high chance of an extreme event, or tipping point, that dramatically and
unexpectedly changes the dynamics of the system. Extreme events—such as large
hurricanes, earthquakes, or pest outbreaks—occur with surprising frequency,31
and can disrupt the system such that it does not return to its prior state.32
One example of the complex, adaptive nature of ecosystems and their
potential for an unknown, extreme event is the ongoing unprecedented
mountain pine beetle epidemic in Western Canada. It is the second largest insect
epidemic in North American history.33 The beetle has decimated the lodgepole
pine population across the province of British Columbia.34 At times, the beetles
travelled in such density that they could be seen as a light drizzle on weather
radar and “fell like rain out of the sky.”35 The mountain pine beetle now covers an
unprecedented range, extending well into the neighbouring province of Alberta.
Moreover, having overrun its historic host, the beetle has begun to attack new
species for the first time, making the entire pan-Canadian boreal forest susceptible
28. CS Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems” (1973) 4 Ann Rev Ecology
& Systematics 1; K Mickelson & WE Rees, “The Environment: Ecological and Ethical
Dimensions” in EL Hughes, AR Lucas & WA Tilleman, eds, Environmental Law and Policy,
3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2003) 1 at 9.
29. EC, Community Health and Consumer Protection, Nanotechnologies: A Preliminary Risk
Analysis on the Basis of a Workshop Organized in Brussels on 1–2 March 2004 by the Health
and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European Commission (Brussels: EC,
2004) 71 at 81.
30. Daniel A Farber, “Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty” (2003) 37:1 UC Davis L Rev 145 at 153; Mickelson & Rees,
supra note 28 at 9.
31. Farber, supra note 30 at 153-54.
32. Mickelson & Rees, supra note 28 at 10.
33. Andrew Nikiforuk, Empire of the Beetle: How Human Folly and a Tiny Bug Are Killing North
America’s Great Forests (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2011) at 55.
34. By 2012, it had killed 53 per cent of all commercially viable pine in the province. See British
Columbia, Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations, A History of the
Battle Against the Mountain Pine Beetle: 2000 to 2012 (Victoria, BC: FLNRO, 2012) at 3,
online: <www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfp/mountain_pine_beetle/Pine%20Beetle%20Response%20
Brief%20History%20May%2023%202012.pdf> [History].
35. Nikiforuk, supra note 33 at 74.
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to attack.36 The epidemic is a natural disaster, albeit an unconventional one,
analogized by one author to a slow-moving tsunami.37
The epidemic will wreak havoc on the British Columbia forest industry, the
province’s primary natural resource industry. It has killed vast areas of forest in
the interior of British Columbia, turning the landscape red, then grey, as the
attacked trees die. The result has been a short-term boom of available timber
that needs to be logged before it rots.38 Even still, the beetle is out-logging the
loggers,39 meaning that around half of all lodgepole pine, deliberately managed for
long-term harvesting, will not be available for harvest in ten- to fifty-years’ time.40
The possibility of catastrophe was not considered by decision makers
responsible for decades of forest management decisions preceding the beetle
epidemic.41 Mountain pine beetle outbreaks are a regular occurrence in forests
dominated by lodgepole pine, to be sure.42 But not on this scale. Although we
now know that the combination of fire suppression43 and climate change44 were
the main drivers of the epidemic, the complexity of ecological relationships
36. Ben Parfitt, Battling the Beetle: Taking Action to Restore British Columbia’s Interior Forests
(Vancouver: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2005) at 16.
37. Nikiforuk, supra note 33, ch 3 at 50ff (“The Lodgepole Tsunami”). Nikiforuk also quotes the
manager of a beetle action coalition, “It’s not something you’ve ever seen before. It’s like a
tsunami that takes twenty-five years instead of two seconds” (ibid at 74).
38. This is known as the timber’s “shelf-life” and is typically in the ten- to fifteen-year range,
depending on local conditions. See Forest Practices Board, Evaluating Mountain Pine Beetle
Management in British Columbia: Special Report (August 2004) at 16, online: <www.for.gov.
bc.ca/hfd/library/documents/bib96861.pdf> [Forest Practices Board, Evaluating].
39. In some areas, by as much as twenty-three times. See Nikiforuk, supra note 33 at 62.
40. Harry Nelson, “Does A Crisis Matter? Forest Policy Responses to the Mountain Pine Beetle
Epidemic in British Columbia” (2007) 55:4 Can J Agric Econ 459 at 463.
41. Forest management decisions were not initially made with lodgepole pine in mind. See Roger
J Whitehead, Les Safranyik & Terry L Shore, “Preventative Management” in Les Safranyik
& Bill Wilson, eds, The Mountain Pine Beetle: A Synthesis of Biology, Management and Impacts
on Lodgepole Pine (Victoria: Pacific Forestry Centre, 2006) 173 at 186. No forestry company
had a management plan or lease provision accounting for beetle outbreaks. See Nikiforuk,
supra note 33 at 52.
42. Forest Practices Board, Evaluating, supra note 38 at 9.
43. Fire suppression tripled the area covered by mature lodgepole pine. See Kim McGarrity &
George Hoberg, “The Beetle Challenge: An Overview of the Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic
and its Implications” (August 2005) at 4 [unpublished, archived at The University of
British Columbia, Faculty of Forestry]. Fire suppression is a basic and uncontroversial forest
management practice for maintaining timber yield. See History, supra note 34 at 2.
44. Historically, mountain pine beetle populations were kept in check by very cold weather—
typically minus thirty-five degrees Celsius for several days. This type of weather event has not
occurred in the British Columbia interior since the winter of 1995–1996.
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made it extremely difficult to know in advance how disparate forest management
decisions could have an impact upon the beetle’s long-term population dynamics
let alone predict how those decisions would intersect with the then undiscovered
phenomenon of climate change. Moreover, the ongoing dynamics of the beetle
continue to defy prediction. “[T]he pine beetle did everything the experts said
it couldn’t do: it flew over mountains, it invaded northern forests, it attacked
spruce trees, and it wiped out pine plantations not much thicker in diameter
than baseball bats.”45
Indeterminacy poses a serious problem for environmental decision making.
It means that our understanding of the problem is necessarily incomplete and that
our ability to predict the effects of our decisions on the environment is limited.46
Moreover, indeterminacy means that both our understanding of the problem
and the problem itself are constantly evolving. Environmental decisions are often
made in a “no-analogue” state,47 where past decisions are of limited usefulness
because they were influenced by a host of complex interactions that have changed
over time. For example, fire suppression decisions in the first half of the twentieth
century were not predictive of possible effects on the mountain pine beetle in the
latter half of the century because never before had these management decisions
intersected with climate change.
This incomplete understanding poses an additional challenge because
complex, adaptive systems also contain the relatively high probability of extreme
events,48 which are also not always knowable in advance. Disturbances within
complex, adaptive systems are not accurately described by simplistic bell curve
distributions, in which the probability of severe events decays rapidly and allows
decision makers to ignore the possibility of extreme events that are “off the chart.”
Rather, complex, adaptive systems are characterized by “fat tail probabilities,”49
meaning that extreme, even catastrophic events, occur with surprising

45. Nikiforuk, supra note 33 at 57.
46. JB Ruhl, “The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and
Sharpening the Questions” (2007) 24:1 Pace Envtl L Rev 25 at 28.
47. Arild Underdal, “Complexity and Challenges of Long-Term Environmental Governance”
(2010) 20:3 Global Envtl Change 386 at 388.
48. Farber, supra note 30 at 152-55; Mickelson & Rees, supra note 28 at 9-10.
49. Farber, supra note 30 at 155.
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frequency. Decision makers cannot justifiably disregard the possibility of such
extreme events.50
The current mountain pine beetle is just that extreme event: A beetle epidemic
so severe that it could not have been predicted by looking at the historical record of
mountain pine beetle outbreaks or indeed any prior insect outbreak in Canada. It
is the unavoidable nasty surprise;51 the unexpected outcome that we did not even
know to look for when deciding to implement widespread fire suppression. The
mountain pine beetle epidemic illustrates that even when we have a decades-old
approach to a problem with a seemingly sound grasp of its dimensions, extreme
unforeseeable events still occur. Our necessarily incomplete understanding of
ecological systems means that surprises—sometimes catastrophic surprises—
are unavoidable.
Our understanding of ecological systems as complex, adaptive systems means
that the epistemic features of emergencies are inherent within all environmental
issues. While it is certainly not the case that all environmental issues contain
the possibility of an extreme event or catastrophe, our inability to distinguish in
advance the ones that contain this possibility from the ones that do not justifies
viewing all environmental issues from this perspective. It is not possible to “carve
out irreversible or catastrophic risks for special treatment,”52 since, as the beetle
example illustrates, we cannot reliably identify these in advance. Moreover, the
dynamics of complex systems mean that some of the most pernicious features of
catastrophes, such as their irreversibility, “should be expected to characterize all
decision nodes within complex adaptive systems.”53 In other words, what may,
at the time of their making, seem like trivial or benign regulatory decisions can
in fact have irreversible environmental effects even if their full impacts do not
materialize until well into the future, long past when anything can be done about
it. Put differently, each environmental issue can be understood as an “emergency
in miniature,”54 in which decisions must be taken under conditions of uncertainty
and the possibility that each decision will be the one that triggers the catastrophe
50. For example, Douglas Kysar’s analysis of the risk assessment for hurricane protection
proceeding Hurricane Katrina, which eliminated one of the most extreme hurricanes
from the analysis as a statistical outlier. See Douglas A Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere:
Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press,
2010) at 77 [Kysar, Regulating].
51. Farber, supra note 30 at 167.
52. Douglas A Kysar, “It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs” (2006)
22:1 J Land Use & Envtl L 1 at 22.
53. Ibid.
54. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 60.
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cannot be eliminated in advance. In this way, the concept of the environmental
emergency reflects our current understanding of ecological systems, irrespective
of the actual probability of a catastrophe or whether, in the end, it in fact occurs.
It is our epistemic inability to distinguish benign from catastrophic policy choices
that justifies viewing all relevant events and policies through the prism of the
emergency paradigm.
By building on this understanding of complex, adaptive ecological
systems, the environmental emergency underscores the fact that environmental
decisions are always taken under conditions of uncertainty. Even at times when
environmental issues have received abundant scientific attention, unforeseen
dimensions still arise. Daniel Bodansky argues that “[m]any of today’s most
serious problems were unanticipated and would probably not have been
prevented even if regulators had chosen the cautious approach.”55 In other words,
the challenge for environmental law is not simply acquiring and incorporating
better environmental science but coping with the complex features inherent in
the issues themselves.56 The challenge, then, is to understand how the rule of law
can operate under conditions of such profound uncertainty.
C. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM POSITION

Understanding environmental issues as an ongoing emergency means that
environmental law faces the same basic challenge as the emergency context:
The challenge of discretion. As we saw in Part I(A), above, Schmitt argued that
the emergency revealed the inevitable need for executive discretion, since the
executive was best positioned to respond to the emergency. However, in reaching
this conclusion, the environmental emergency conflicts with a dominant position
in Canadian environmental law, the environmental reform position, which
objects to the pervasiveness of discretion in Canadian environmental law.
While the environmental reform position is not monolithic, its core
attributes are shared among many Canadian environmental law scholars. In
particular, environmental reformers lament the extent of administrative discretion
that permeates Canadian environmental law. David Boyd calls environmental
statutes “paper tigers” because their lofty goals are subtly but consistently
undermined by discretionary “loopholes” through which industry receives

55. “Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle” (1991) 33:7 Env Sci & Pol
Sustainable Dev 4 at 43.
56. Douglas A Kysar, “Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality” (2004) 31:3 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 555 at 565.
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authorizations to pollute, degrade, and harm the environment.57 Environmental
reformers are rightly concerned about the exercise of discretion in a way that
undermines statutory objectives and contributes to Canada’s poor track record
on environmental protection.58
These concerns about discretion stem from the fact that it is often exercised
to allow short-term interests to trump long-term environmental protection.59
This observation is supported by numerous theories of regulation that posit that
regulated industries are able to coordinate and advance their interests within the
administrative process whereas environmental interests are under-represented
due to their diffuse and often intangible nature.60 Furthermore, regulators face
both epistemic and resource constraints that require considerable cooperation
from regulated parties both to provide relevant information, and to comply
with regulation in the absence of rigorous monitoring and enforcement.61 The
significance of Canada’s natural resource industries in the Canadian economy
has nurtured this cozy relationship between industry and government,62 which,
in turn, fuels a deep distrust of executive discretion by environmental reformers.
Some reformers also argue that the extent of discretion in Canadian
environmental law undermines the rule of law itself.63 Bruce Pardy argues that
environmental law “is one of the most extreme examples of legal disciplines in
which the commitment to principles of predictability, abstraction, and separation
57. Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2003) at 231. For additional examples of this critique, see Linda Nowlan, “CPR for
Canadian Rivers – Law to Conserve, Protect, and Restore Environmental Flows in Canada”
(2012) 23:3 J Envtl L & Prac 237 at 257; Bruce Pardy & Annette Stoehr, “The Failed
Reform of Ontario’s Mining Laws” (2012) 23:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1 at 6, 13-14; Emily
Walter, “Decoding Codes of Practice: Approaches to Regulating the Ecological Impacts of
Logging in British Columbia” (2005) 15:2 J Envtl L & Prac 143 at 156.
58. Boyd, supra note 57 at 5-10. My previous work has also assumed the environmental reform
position for this reason. See Shaun Fluker & Jocelyn Stacey, “The Basics of Species at Risk
Legislation in Alberta” (2012) 50:1 Alta L Rev 95.
59. Boyd, supra note 57 at 232, 237-38, 263. See also Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, online: <www.cec.org/> (parties have filed dozens of petitions on Canada’s
failure to enforce its environmental laws).
60. For a nice overview of these theories as well as a critique of their weaknesses and an
evaluation of their empirical support, see Stephen P Croley, “Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the Administrative Process” (1998) 98:1 Colum L Rev 1 at 32ff.
61. D Paul Emond, “The Greening of Environmental Law” (1990) 36:3 McGill
LJ 742 at 744-45.
62. Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner & Benjamin Richardson, “What Ever Happened to Canadian
Environmental Law?” (2011) 37:4 Ecology LQ 981 at 1025.
63. Lynda Collins, “Tort, Democracy and Environmental Governance: The Case of
Non-Enforcement” (2007) 15:1 Tort L Rev 107 at 111.
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of powers has been consistently abandoned.”64 Pervasive administrative discretion
means that significant environmental policymaking does not take place in the
open legislature. Rather, as Lynda Collins observes, “crucial decisions regarding
trade-offs between short-term economic gain and long-term harm to health
and the environment are … made behind closed doors generally without the
knowledge of the electorate, and therefore without accountability.”65
Reformers further observe that environmental statutes lack specific and clear
legal rules and, instead, set out broad objectives to ‘manage’ the environment
while simultaneously maintaining or promoting natural resource development.
This means that environmental decisions amount to “discretionary judgment
calls,”66 in which virtually any decision is defensible67 in light of the broad and
potentially conflicting legislative objectives. Indeed, the environmental reform
position highlights the fact that the courts provide an ineffective constraint on
the exercise of discretion in environmental law. Environmental decisions are
often not reviewable by the courts or are reviewed on such a deferential basis that
virtually any decision is legally permissible.68 The environmental reform position
therefore concludes that executive decision makers are not effectively constrained
by the rule of law.
The difficulty revealed by the environmental emergency is that administrative
discretion is necessary not only to respond immediately to an urgent
environmental catastrophe—to stem the tide of a mountain pine beetle epidemic,
for example—but also to ensure that each environmental decision reflects the
best understanding of the invariably dynamic problem at hand. Yet this kind
of profound discretion does not square easily with a traditional understanding
of the rule of law, as reflected by the concerns of the environmental reform
position. It means that the executive exercises significant policymaking authority,
authority that is not effectively constrained either by ex ante legislative rules or
by ex post judicial review. In these respects, the executive holds and exercises
decision-making power in much the way Schmitt thinks that sovereigns must
hold and exercise power to deal with national security emergencies. As we shall
now see, the challenge that emergencies pose for the rule of law is the best way to
understand the problem we face in the environmental context.
64. “Environmental Assessment and Three Ways Not to Do Environmental Law” (2010) 21 J
Envtl L & Prac 139 at 149 [Pardy, “EA”].
65. Supra note 63 at 110-11.
66. Pardy, “EA,” supra note 64 at 149; Collins, supra note 63 at 111.
67. Pardy, “EA,” supra note 64 at 147.
68. Boyd, supra note 57 at 269.
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II. THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF DISCRETION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
This section builds on Schmitt’s challenge: To show how emergencies can be
governed by law in order to uncover our basic assumptions about law and its
ability to constrain emergency powers. The real challenge in the emergency
context arises from a formal conception of the rule of law, which equates law with
rules enacted by the legislature. Drawing on the emergency literature, I argue that
the formal conception is incapable of constraining emergency power because it
makes no room for the exercise of administrative discretion. In the emergency
context, a desire to preserve the formal conception of the rule of law leads judges
to find legal black holes, in which statutes attempt to exempt the executive
from legal constraints,69 and grey holes, in which there are some constraints on
executive action but not enough to constrain it in any meaningful way.70 In other
words, legal black and grey holes emerge when the formal conception collides
with the exercise of administrative discretion. As we will see, these concepts of
legal black and grey holes allow us to flesh out fully the nature of the problem of
discretion that is the core concern of the environmental reform position.
A. THE CHALLENGE OF EMERGENCIES

As we have seen, Schmitt’s basic argument is that emergencies cannot be governed
by law. Schmitt argues that since the exception is unknowable in advance, the best
that can be done is to indicate who can make the decisions that must be made to
contend with the exception. He claims that it is the sovereign, or executive, who
has the authority to decide “whether there is an extreme emergency as well as
what must be done to eliminate it,”71 and thus that the exception is what reveals
who is in fact the sovereign.72 Any attempt to prescribe how the sovereign must
respond to the exception is undermined by the fact that the exception cannot
be predicted in advance and therefore may require the violation of pre-existing

69. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 3. The term “legal black hole” was used to describe
the US detention regime at Guantanamo Bay. See Johan Steyn, “Guantanamo Bay: The Legal
Black Hole” (2004) 53:1 ICLQ 1.
70. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 3.
71. Schmitt, supra note 20 at 5.
72. Ibid at 6, 13.
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rules. The sovereign, then, is unconstrained both in declaring the exception and
determining what to do about it.73
Schmitt’s account of the emergency presupposes a specific understanding
of law: He equates law with general legislative rules enacted in advance of
the emergency. On Schmitt’s understanding of law, the legislature is the only
legitimate source of legal norms, and since emergencies cannot be anticipated,
they cannot be governed by pre-existing legal rules. I follow David Dyzenhaus
and others by calling this the “formal conception of the rule of law” because it
emphasizes the requirement of a formal allocation of distinct powers between
institutions of government.74
For those that adhere to a formal conception of the rule of law, there are only
two possible responses to the emergency. The first is to follow Schmitt in declaring
that emergencies cannot be governed by law and in advocating an extralegal
response to the emergency that empowers public officials to take whatever actions
they see fit to respond to a crisis.75 By and large, however, an extralegal approach
is seen as incompatible with modern liberal-democratic principles.76 Dyzenhaus
calls this the “compulsion of legality”: The reality that public officials are not
wont to act in open contravention of the law but will rather seek to legitimize
their acts by claiming that they have legal authority.77

73. Ibid at 6-7. The need for unfettered authority—including the decision to suspend the legal
order altogether—cannot be ruled out, according to Schmitt, because it may be needed to
defend against an existential threat. Schmitt argues that the exception reveals that the state
cannot be completely circumscribed by law since responding to the exception hinges on the
discretionary decision-making power of the sovereign.
74. David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction:
Baker v Canada” (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 197-205; Martin Loughlin, “Procedural Fairness:
A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory” (1978) 28:2 UTLJ 215; Geneviève
Cartier, “Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial Abstinence?”
(2003) 53:3 UTLJ 217.
75. See e.g. Mark Tushnet, “Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism” in Mark Tushnet,
ed, The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency (Durham, UK: Duke
University Press, 2005) 39; Posner & Vermeule, Terror, supra note 19. Gross advances an
extralegal approach but argues that it is grounded in a Lockean understanding of prerogative
powers. See Gross, supra note 17.
76. See Thomas Poole, “Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common Law” (2009) 7:2 Intl J
Const L 247 at 252-58 (on the move away from prerogative powers).
77. “Cycles of Legality in Emergency Times” (2007) 18 Pub L Rev 165 at 167
[Dyzenhaus, “Cycles”].

1002 (2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

The second possible response is to attempt to “accommodate” emergencies
within the legal order.78 Accommodation can take many forms, but it seeks
to strike a compromise by imposing some rule-of-law requirements while still
allowing for the inevitable flexibility needed by the executive to respond to a
crisis. For example, a statute may set out requirements for responding to an
emergency, such as Canada’s Emergencies Act79 and Emergency Management Act.80
The problem is that, since the emergency is unforeseeable, the requirements
contained in the pre-existing statute will be necessarily very broad and will
unavoidably delegate expansive discretionary authority to the executive.81 The
more extreme or unforeseeable the emergency, the more that pre-existing laws
need to be stretched in order to ground the emergency response in law.
Dyzenhaus helpfully characterizes the problem of accommodation in terms
of legal black and grey holes. Legal black holes arise from situations in which
the legislature attempts to create a space uncontrolled by law, for example, by
delegating ostensibly unfettered discretion to the executive to act in response to
a crisis. Canada’s now repealed War Measures Act82 is a paradigmatic example of
a legal black hole: A legislative blank cheque83 to the executive to do whatever
it likes. Dyzenhaus argues that legal grey holes are even more problematic than
legal black holes, however, because they give the appearance of legal constraint
without actually constraining executive action meaningfully.84 They are legal
black holes in disguise.85 When emergency response decisions are challenged in
court, judges adhering to a formal conception of the rule of law will validate these
78. See especially Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern
Democracies (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002); Ackerman, supra note 19.
See also Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006) ch 1 at 17ff; Eric A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, “Accommodating
Emergencies” (2003) 56:3 Stan L Rev 605; John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, “The Law of
Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers” (2004) 2:2 Intl J Const L 210.
79. RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp).
80. SC 2007, c 15.
81. Moreover, as Schmitt would point out, even an emergency statute may need to be suspended
to respond to a truly extreme threat. It should also be noted that accommodation also comes
in the form of judges relaxing ordinary rule-of-law requirements such as due process. See
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 at para 77, [2002] 1
SCR 3; Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350
(the Court avoids the true nature of the detention scheme to find that it does not violate the
right to detention); Dyzenhaus, “Cycles,” supra note 77 at 174. [Suresh].
82. RSC 1970, c W-2.
83. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 50.
84. Ibid at 42.
85. Ibid at 3.
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black and grey holes by holding that the executive acts with legal authority.86 But
this effectively creates a ‘rule-of-law façade,’ from which executive decisions are
governed by law only in the thin sense that they comply formally with validly
enacted legislation even though their enabling legislation may not set out any
substantive constraints on the exercise of discretion.87
The response of the government of British Columbia to the mountain
pine beetle epidemic created numerous potential legal black and grey holes.
For example, the Lieutenant Governor in Council (“LGIC”) promulgated an
emergency Bark Beetle Regulation that enabled targeted harvesting efforts and
relaxed ordinary administrative requirements.88 The Beetle Regulation delegated
unfettered discretionary authority to the Minister of Forests to identify
emergency management areas for mountain pine beetle treatment “if satisfied”
that a forest was attacked or in danger of attack.89 In addition, the regulation was
itself authorized by a statutory provision that delegated open-ended discretion to
the executive to issue regulations “respecting the protection of forest resources.”90
The Minister of Forests also exercised discretion to determine the “policies and
procedures”91 to apply the minimum royalty to beetle-killed timber. Finally,
the Chief Forester dramatically increased the allowable annual cut, raising the
total amount of timber that companies could harvest in heavily affected regions
to facilitate the epidemic response.92 Each response was a highly controversial,
discretionary decision taken at the administrative—not the legislative—level.
Note that the prevalence of discretion in the mountain pine beetle example
is precisely the concern of the environmental reform position, a concern that
86. For a particularly clear example of this, see Hamdi et al v Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense et
al, 542 US 507 (2004). The US Supreme Court finds that the use of military tribunals for
American enemy combatants was authorized by the very generic Authorization for the Use of
Military Force.
87. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 3. See also Secretary of State for the Home
Department v MB, [2006] EWHC Admin 1000 at para 103 [Re MB, Admin] (Sullivan J used
the phrase “thin veneer of legality” to describe the UK special detention regime).
88. BC Reg 286/2001 [Beetle Regulation].
89. Ibid, s 2.
90. Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act, RSBC 1996, c 159, s 211.1, as repealed by
Forest and Range Practices Amendment Act, 2003, SBC 2003, c 55, s 103.
91. Forest Act, RSBC 1996, c 157, s 105.
92. Nelson, supra note 40 at 465. While the Chief Forester must “consider” a list of statutorily
prescribed factors in reaching this decision, he has considerable policy-making discretion over
how to account for these factors in his ultimate decision. Forest Act, supra note 91, s 8(8);
Jeremy Rayner, “Fine-Tuning the Settings: The Timber Supply Review” in Benjamin Cashore
et al, In Search of Sustainability: British Columbia Forest Policy in the 1990s (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2000) 140 at 142.
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we can now situate within the formal conception of the rule of law. Since the
epidemic was unforeseen and the understanding of its dynamics changed rapidly
over the course of each season, discretion was essential to respond quickly to
the epidemic. The response was difficult to specify in advance and therefore
could not be effected exclusively through ex ante legislative rules.93 Moreover, all
three decisions resulted from the exercise of everyday administrative discretion:
regulation making,94 individual exemptions from ordinary forestry requirements,
and discretionary decisions on stumpage fees and total harvest—all forms of
discretion that the environmental reform position understands as threatening
the rule of law. The legislature deliberately delegated this authority to make
significant policy decisions about British Columbia’s forests, and indeed, it is
difficult to see how it could have done otherwise. All of the decisions require
sophisticated knowledge of the forest industry and continual updating across all
regions of the province in response to changing environmental, economic, and
social conditions.
In other words, the possibility of legal black and grey holes extends
beyond the immediate aftermath of an emergency since such holes emerge
whenever the formal conception of the rule of law intersects with the exercise of
discretion. The emergency is one striking example of the exercise of discretion,
but discretion exists in non-exceptional cases as well. Dyzenhaus observes that
every discretionary decision, for Schmitt, must be a “mini state of emergency or
exception”95 because the “official … has to make a quasi-sovereign or legislative
decision, one that is ultimately unconstrained by legal norms.”96 What remains
to be seen is whether these kinds of discretionary environmental decisions are in
fact subject to a formal conception of the rule of law, which we now know from
the environmental emergency would result in the creation of legal black and grey
holes that leave discretion effectively unconstrained by the rule of law.
B. BLACK AND GREY HOLES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

We shall now see that the environmental emergency validates the concerns of
the environmental reform position: The formal conception persists in Canadian
93. Even alternative proposals would have proceeded through the same discretionary regulatory
mechanisms. See generally Parfitt, supra note 36.
94. The Beetle Regulation was an emergency regulation but did not differ substantively from
ordinary environmental regulation in which discretionary authority to make orders or
exemptions is utterly commonplace. See Boyd, supra note 57 at 140, 142.
95. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 60.
96. Ibid.
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environmental law and results in the creation of legal black and grey holes that
do not meaningfully constrain the exercise of discretion in the environmental
context. As I will explain, judges committed to the formal conception create
legal black holes when they declare environmental decisions not justiciable,
only subject to review for vires, and not subject to common law requirements of
procedural fairness. They create legal grey holes when they fail to give substantive
statutory constraints any rule-of-law “teeth.” First, however, it is necessary to say
more about how legal black and grey holes come to be in administrative law.
The influence of the formal conception on Canadian administrative law can
be traced to A.V. Dicey’s conception of the rule of law, which distinguishes between
the dual roles of the legislature and the judiciary.97 On the one hand, he argues, the
legislature possesses a monopoly over lawmaking and, on the other, the judiciary
possesses a monopoly over law interpretation.98 The modern administrative state
presents a fundamental problem for this conception of the rule of law. When
the legislature deliberately delegates discretionary authority to administrative
decision makers, Diceyan—or formalist—judges attempt to preserve the formal
conception of the rule of law in the face of conflicting legislative intentions.
On the one hand, the legislature signals that the administrative decision maker,
not the court, has final decision-making authority; but, on the other, the logical
inference is that the legislature intends some limits on the statutorily-created
decision maker’s power.
The formalist judge attempts to reconcile this tension by according the
administrative decision maker “free rein within certain legal limits,”99 which
means that judges will strictly enforce the statutory language and common law
requirements of procedural fairness but will give decision makers free rein over
the substance of their decisions. In other words, formalist judges are content
to create legal black holes whereby issues that fall within the administrator’s
statutory jurisdiction are only governed by the rule of law insofar as they are
authorized by validly enacted legislation. And they will be content to create
legal grey holes, meaning that they will find the statutory language poses no
meaningful constraint on the exercise of discretion.

97. AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed (Toronto:
Macmillan Company of Canada, 1959). Dicey’s conception has been “remarkably
influential” on Canadian administrative law. See National Corn Growers Assn v Canada
(Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at para 74, 74 DLR (4th) 449, Wilson J.
98. Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 74 at 198.
99. Ibid at 204.
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1.

LEGAL BLACK HOLES: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS

As we saw in the mountain pine beetle context, the legislature often delegates
significant discretionary authority to the executive to issue regulations. Many
of the details and difficult trade-offs required by environmental statutes are left
to regulations. This means that the executive has discretion both over whether
to issue regulations and what those regulations should say. The environmental
emergency reveals that regulations issued by the executive exist in a legal black
hole: The failure to issue regulations is not justiciable, regulations are subject only
to vires review, and they are not subject to the requirements of procedural fairness.
On the failure to issue regulations, the law is very clear: The matter is not
justiciable.100 Regulations have the force of law; they are a form of delegated
legislation and thus an extension of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament can
choose to legislate (or not) over any matter. Applying the same logic to delegated
legislation, courts have concluded that they cannot require the executive to issue
regulations where it has not done so.101 But regulations cannot, in principle, be
entirely off limits for formalist judges. The promulgation of regulations, just like
any other exercise of delegated authority, is bound by its statutory scheme, and the
formalist judge must patrol those statutory boundaries. Formalist judges, then,
feel a great deal of strain when faced with challenges to the legality of regulations.
The Federal Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth – Les Ami(e)s de la Terre v
Canada (Governor in Council)102 brings this formalist tension to the surface. The
issue arose from the executive’s intransigence regarding the federal Kyoto Protocol
Implementation Act.103 The legislation, passed by the opposition parties against
the minority government, set out ostensibly binding requirements, including
a requirement to issue regulations to mitigate climate change by a specific
deadline, which the executive failed to do.104 The administrative decision not
to issue regulations by a statutory deadline fell squarely within the traditional
law-making monopoly, which requires judicial abstinence from the formalist’s
perspective. But the refusal to act also directly undermined the objective of the
legislation and the specific language of the authorizing provisions. The only way
100. See e.g. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2008 FCA 229 at para 53, [2009]
3 FCR 136; John Mark Keyes, Executive Legislation, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis
Canada, 2010) at 529.
101. Ibid.
102. 2008 FC 1183, [2009] 3 FCR 201 [FOTE].
103. SC 2007, c 30, as repealed by Jobs, Growth, and Long-Term Prosperity Act, SC
2012, c 19, s 699.
104. Ibid, ss 7-9.
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the Federal Court could make sense of this tension was to conclude that the
provisions “reflect only a permissive intent”105 and that the legislature did not
intend to create legally enforceable duties.106 This interpretation allowed the
Federal Court to keep the formal conception intact. The court created a legal
black hole by patrolling the boundaries of the legislation and simply concluding
that there were none that could be legally enforced.107
In addition, the executive typically has broad discretion over the substance
of regulations. The environmental reform position highlights the concern that
the substance of regulations can easily undermine the environmental protection
goals articulated by the legislature. Judicial review of regulations in Canada again
seems to validate this concern. Regulations are subject to judicial review only for
their vires; that is, on the narrow question of whether they fall within the scope
of the statutory authority under which they were promulgated.108 Vires review
is a direct product of the formal conception. From this perspective, the judicial
role is to police the boundaries of the statute. The substance of the regulations,
their wisdom, and their ability to achieve the legislative objective are entirely
off limits to the courts. Only if the regulation is “irrelevant,” “extraneous,” or
“completely unrelated to the statutory purpose” will the court find that the
regulation is invalid.109 This means that it is extremely difficult to challenge
regulations that undermine environmental protection goals contained in their
enabling legislation. Both the purpose of environmental legislation and the
specific provisions enabling regulation making are often cast in extremely broad
terms, meaning that it would take an outrageous regulation to exceed these
statutory limits.110
Moreover, environmental regulations are not subject to the duty of procedural
fairness. The doctrine of procedural fairness has consistently required judges to

105. FOTE, supra note 102 at para 37.
106. Ibid at para 35.
107. Ibid at para 46. The court states: “[T]he Court has no role to play reviewing the
reasonableness of the government’s response to Canada’s Kyoto commitments within the four
corners of the [Act].”
108. The Supreme Court of Canada most recently affirmed this in Katz Group Canada Inc v
Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2013 SCC 64, 3 SCR 810.
109. Ibid at para 28.
110. See e.g. Sandy Pond Alliance to Protect Canadian Waters Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2013
FC 1112, 81 CELR (3d) 175. The Federal Court upheld a regulation that permitted the
conversion of a lake into a tailings pond for untreated mining effluent on the basis that the
Fisheries Act was for the “general management” of the fisheries (ibid at para 70).
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formally classify decisions to determine whether the duty of fairness applies.111
While the courts have expanded the duty of fairness from decisions categorized as
judicial or “quasi-judicial” to most administrative decisions, they have retained a
category of “legislative” decisions that are not subject to common law procedural
requirements.112 The legislative distinction is a remnant of the formal conception,
under which the integrity of the legislative process was maintained through
judicial non-interference.113 Judges broadened the requirements of procedural
fairness to encompass all adjudicatory administrative decisions out of concern for
the preservation of the integrity of the judicial process. But these requirements
had no such role in decisions of a legislative nature.114 Since environmental
decisions are often complex, “political” matters that courts implicitly understand
as part of the traditional law-making monopoly, they are not typically subject to
the duty of procedural fairness.115
The formal conception singles out the “law-making” character or appearance
of the administrative decision. Regulations fall squarely within the law-making
category because they are functionally identical to legislation and are thus
understood to be outside the proper sphere of the courts. But this conclusion
overstates important distinctions between the two. Unlike the legislature, the
executive has no inherent authority to make law. This means that regulations
always exist within a legal framework. And while regulations are typically issued
by elected decision makers—a minister or cabinet—it is incorrect to assume, as
the formal conception seems to, that this is a sufficient condition for democratic
legitimacy. Legislation is democratic not only because it is enacted by elected
officials but also because it is the product of deliberation and open debate by
opposing parties.116 While formal regulations are subject to some uniform
requirements such as publication,117 procedural requirements for regulations are

111. Grant Huscroft, “From Natural Justice to Fairness: Thresholds, Content, and the Role
of Judicial Review” in C Flood & L Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2012) 147 at 148-49.
112. Ibid at 156-57.
113. Cartier, supra note 74 at 237.
114. Ibid.
115. Imperial Oil v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 at para 38, 2 SCR 264.
See also Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 1435 at para 113, 3 Imm LR (4th) 175.
116. Cartier, supra note 74 at 242-43.
117. Statutory Instruments Act, RSC 1985, c S-22 (notably, the s 5 requirement of publication).
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patchy.118 Moreover, the formal conception ignores the fact that the legislature
has deliberately relinquished its monopoly over law making by delegating general
policy-making authority to the executive.119 Indeed, the simple fact that the
legislature has authorized the exercise of discretion is true of all administrative
action and is not sufficient to immunize an administrative decision from judicial
oversight in any other context.
The persistence of the formal conception in the case of regulations presents
another problem. Because the formal conception is a product of a practical
compromise, there is no principled basis on which to distinguish the kinds of
“law making” that attract vires review from those that are subject to substantive
review or to distinguish those that attract the duty of procedural fairness from
“legislative” decisions that do not. While formal regulations may be easy enough
to delineate, courts, relying on the formal conception, have concluded that
environmental policies are “legislative” and not the proper subject of review.120
Even in instances in which the executive is delegated authority to make an
individual decision, judges have relied on the formal conception to give the
decision maker effectively free rein.121 Moreover, the formal conception ignores
the fact that environmental decision makers are often delegated the choice of
regulatory instrument; that is, a decision can be taken by way of regulation,
informal policy, or ad hoc individual decision.122 All options have the same effect
on the environment and on the authorized individual but are potentially subject
to different rule-of-law requirements based on their classification. In short, there
is no clear dimension along which the courts can determine which issues are
sufficiently political or legislative in nature that they ought to be exempt from
substantive judicial review.123 When faced with complex policy matters, the

118. Andrew Green, “Regulations and Rule Making: The Dilemma of Delegation” in C Flood
& L Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications, 2013) 125 at 142.
119. Cartier, supra note 74 at 238.
120. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) (1984), 51 BCLR 105 at 13, 8
DLR (4th) 33 (CA) (review of the stumpage policy). Moreover, the Court’s characterization
of what counts as “legislative” seems to have shifted. For a comparison, see Canadian
National Railway v Canada, 2014 SCC 40 at para 51, [2014] 2 SCR 145; Attorney General
(Canada) v Inuit Tapirisat et al, [1980] 2 SCR 735 at para 30, 115 DLR (3d) 1.
121. Carpenter Fishing Corp v Canada, [1998] 2 FC 548 at para 37, 155 DLR (4th) 572. This case
was reaffirmed in Association des crevettiers acadiens du Golfe inc c Canada (Attorney General),
2011 FC 305, 204 ACWS (3d) 181.
122. See e.g. Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14, s 35(2).
123. Cartier, supra note 74 at 233.
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courts can revert to vires review even at times when the decision lacks the insignia
of actual law making.
2.

LEGAL GREY HOLES: INEFFECTIVE SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRAINTS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS

In addition to these black holes, the formal conception also leads judges to
create legal grey holes in cases in which the legislature has imposed some, albeit
minimal, substantive constraints on environmental decisions. For example, the
emergency mountain pine beetle regulation authorized the Minister of Forests to
make a designation “if satisfied” that an area was attacked or in danger of being
attacked. This language reflects the complex context in which the decision maker
is expected to operate: Certain relevant factors may be identified in advance,
but what these factors look like in any given situation will vary as will how the
decision maker might account for them. Delegating decision-making authority
in subjective terms—“if satisfied that” or “of the opinion that”—is common
in environmental law. Although the legislature has, in these circumstances,
attempted to set out some substantive criteria for guiding a difficult and inevitably
discretionary decision, courts are frequently unwilling to give these criteria any
rule-of-law teeth.
A striking creation of a legal grey hole arose again in the British Columbia
forestry context. In David Suzuki Foundation et al v The AG for BC,124 the David
Suzuki Foundation challenged the decision of the LGIC to issue an exemption
to a prohibition of the export of timber from northwestern British Columbia.
Under the Forest Act, the LGIC could grant an exemption “if satisfied” that,
among other conditions, the timber was in surplus.125 The Foundation argued
that the surplus condition was not met and therefore the exemption was ultra
vires the Forest Act. The British Columbia Supreme Court disagreed. It found
that the provision conferred an “exclusive,”126 “complete, unfettered, subjective
discretion”127 on the LGIC to issue an exemption. The Forest Act only required
that the LGIC “be satisfied” that the conditions were met. Since the order itself
stated that the LGIC was satisfied as to the existence of the conditions, the court
was not entitled to look beyond the order to assess whether the objective evidence
supported the decision. The court was content with the fact there was “some
evidence” supporting the decision and found that “the conditions which may have
124.
125.
126.
127.

2004 BCSC 620, 17 Admin LR (4th) 85 [Suzuki].
Supra note 91, s 128(1).
Suzuki, supra note 124 at para 11.
Ibid at para 12.
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motivated the LGIC … are irrelevant.”128 The court understood its role in “a basic
jurisdictional” sense, meaning that the court’s role was to patrol the boundaries
of the legislation, not to second-guess decisions taken within those bounds.129
Even when the court purports to conduct substantive review to determine
whether a decision is reasonable, it can still create a legal grey hole.130 In Sierra Club
Canada v Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources),131 the Sierra Club challenged the
Minister of Natural Resources’s decision to permit the disturbance of endangered
species habitat for the construction of a new bridge across the Detroit River. The
legislation set out the Minister’s authority in purely subjective terms, requiring
that the Minister consult with “a person who is considered by the Minister to be
an expert … and to be independent of the person who would be authorized by the
permit to engage in the activity.”132 At issue was the fact that one expert report on
which the Minister relied, and which contradicted a second expert, was produced
by an employee of the company bidding for the project.133 While the court
expressed reservations about the appearance of a lack of independence, “which
the Minister might have been better to avoid,”134 the court nonetheless found
that the Minister complied with the Act in question. It did so in purely formal
terms. Since the expert provided the Minister with a statement that declared
his independence, the court found that “[s]trictly speaking, it confirm[ed] the
independence of the expert”135 and all that the legislation required was “that the
Minister consult and obtain a written report.”136 In other words, the court created
a legal grey hole in which a legislative requirement to consult with independent
128. Ibid at para 145.
129. Ibid at para 91.
130. Whether any given application of reasonableness review is underpinned by a formal
conception or not is an open question since the application of reasonableness is far from
consistent. See e.g. Matthew Lewans, “Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir”
(2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ 59; Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness Review”
(2015) 52 Alta L Rev [forthcoming]. For another controversial environmental example of
how the formal conception persists even under the guise of substantive review, see Forest
Ethics Advocacy Association and Sinclair v National Energy Board, 2014 FCA 245, 246 ACWS
(3d) 191. In this case, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the National Energy Board’s
restrictive interpretation of its mandate (to exclude upstream and downstream greenhouse
gas emissions) largely on the grounds that the statutory language does not explicitly require
consideration of such large scale effects.
131. 2011 ONSC 4655, 344 DLR (4th) 148 [Sierra].
132. Endangered Species Act, 2007, SO 2007, c 6, s 17(2).
133. Sierra, supra note 131 at para 64.
134. Ibid at para 68.
135. Ibid at para 65.
136. Ibid at paras 72, 90.
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experts before deciding whether an activity will jeopardize the survival or recovery
of an endangered species is no more than an empty reporting exercise that does
not receive meaningful scrutiny on review.
Indeed, it seems that only in egregious cases in which the decision
completely lacks an evidentiary basis will the court intervene.137 So long as
there is evidence that the decision maker turned his or her mind to the relevant
statutory factors—ticked the appropriate boxes—the court will not question the
basis for the decision maker’s subjective judgment.138 Without some examination
of the decision maker’s reasons for a decision, however, virtually any outcome
is permissible since, as we have seen, environmental legislation is cast in the
broadest of terms. Indeed, allegations that a decision maker has been driven by
an improper purpose, such as political lobbying139 or, as we have seen, a potential
stake in the outcome, are often skimmed over on the way to the court’s conclusion
that the outcome falls easily within the broad perimeters of the legislation.140
The court’s justification for focusing on the outcome rather than on the
record or reasons for the decision is logical from the perspective of the formal
conception of the rule of law. Discretionary environmental decisions involve
complex scientific issues and policy-laden considerations, which are typically
accompanied by a clear legislative signal that the decision maker ought to have
wide room for manoeuvre. For the court to scrutinize the substance of these
decisions would pull judges far away from their traditional monopoly of law
interpretation. The court is not “an academy of science to arbitrate conflicting
137. Alberta Wilderness Association v Minister of Environment, 2009 FC 710, 94 Admin LR
(4th) 81; Environmental Defence Canada v Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans, 2009 FC
878, 349 FTR 225.
138. Sierra, supra note 131 at para 77. See also Western Canada Wilderness Committee v British
Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2014 BCSC 808, 84
CELR (3d) 85; David Suzuki Foundation v British Columbia (Minister of Environment), 2013
BCSC 874, 240 ACWS (3d) 641; Pacific Booker Minerals Inc v British Columbia (Minister of
Environment), 2013 BCSC 2258, 236 ACWS (3d) 641; Castle-Crown Wilderness Coalition
v Alberta (Director of Regulatory Assurance Division, Alberta Environment), 2005 ABCA 283,
371 AR 370 (all involving qualified discretion).
139. Malcolm v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2014 FCA 130 at para 57, 76
Admin LR (5th) 179.
140. Review is often further hampered by courts’ unwillingness to require decision makers to give
reasons. See Lorne Sossin, “The Unfinished Project of Roncarelli v. Duplessis: Justiciability,
Discretion, and the Limits of the Rule of Law” (2010) 55:3 McGill LJ 661 at 684. Indeed,
recent developments at the Supreme Court of Canada seem to continually weaken the
requirement to offer reasons. See especially British Columbia (Securities Commission) v
McLean, 2013 SCC 67, 3 SCR 895 (the Court accepts ex post rationalizations of the
administrative decision).
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scientific predictions.”141 Nor is it in the business of law making, in the sense
of making policy determinations about the appropriateness of fishing licences,
project approvals, or endangered species protection.
The influence of the formal conception of the rule of law, even in cases of
individual environmental decisions, supports the environmental reform position’s
concern that judges are not imposing effective constraints on the exercise of
discretion. To give meaning to substantive statutory criteria would require them
to review matters that fall well outside their traditional monopoly. They thus
resort to the creation of legal grey holes, which permit decision makers to claim
that they are acting in accordance with the rule of law without being subject to
meaningful judicial oversight.

III. RESPONDING TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY
The argument so far has been that the environmental emergency reveals both
the necessity and desirability of discretion but that the formal conception of the
rule of law is incapable of providing meaningful constraints on the exercise of
that discretion. In other words, the environmental reform position is right to
call attention to the pervasive problem of discretion in Canadian environmental
law since the courts seem beholden to the formal conception that leads judges
to create legal black and grey holes. Yet, the environmental reform position does
not seem to face up to the emergency features inherent in environmental issues.
Reformers offer up two possible reforms, both of which follow from a formal
conception of the rule of law and thus cannot deliver the rule-of-law constraints
that the environmental reform position seeks. This article assesses these two
responses and concludes by introducing a competing conception of the rule of
law, one that requires an ongoing commitment to public justification and points
to the necessity of creative institutional design in environmental law.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM SOLUTIONS

This section focuses on two common solutions that follow from the environmental
reform position: stricter legislative rules and delegation to independent decision
makers. To be sure, environmental reformers may disagree on the respective
strengths and weaknesses of these potential solutions and offer more detailed
reform proposals for specific environmental issues. Nevertheless, much of
Canadian environmental law scholarship has focused on the potential for either
141. Vancouver Island Peace Society v Canada, [1992] 3 FC 42 at para 12, 53 FTR 300.
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legislative reform to create rules or independent decision making to strengthen
Canadian environmental law.
For example, Boyd instructs that “[d]iscretionary language in environmental
laws and regulations should be replaced by mandatory language; three decades
of experience have proven time and again that politicians and bureaucrats will
exercise their discretion to the environment’s detriment.”142 Similarly, Pardy
advocates crafting an “environmental rule” that would prohibit non-natural,
permanent damage to ecosystems.143 But for reasons already discussed, neither
proposal would solve the problem of discretion. To recapitulate, it is not possible
to eliminate discretionary language because it is often impossible to know in
advance what actions should be taken to achieve environmental protection
objectives. This is the key insight that follows from viewing the environment as
an ongoing emergency.
Pardy’s proposal, while considerably more elegant than the current tangle of
prohibitions, qualifiers, and exemptions found in Canadian environmental law,
simply embeds discretionary judgment calls within its open-textured language.144
What constitutes non-natural, permanent, or even an ecosystem is a highly
contextual and often contentious determination. Under a general environmental
rule, discretion would not be eliminated or minimized, merely shuffled around.
Schmitt’s challenge cannot be met by simply making fewer, simpler, or better ex
ante rules. But to see that this solution is inadequate, environmental law has to
own up to its unavoidable subjection to Schmitt’s challenge in the first place.
The second solution that follows from the environmental reform position—
delegating environmental decision-making authority to independent experts
rather than elected members of the executive—raises a similar problem.
Independent expert tribunals appeal to the environmental reform position
because they promise to remove politics from environmental decision making.
For example, the 2012 amendments to the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act, which transferred final decision-making authority over energy projects
from the National Energy Board to the federal Cabinet, prompted an outcry
representative of the reform position. The problem, one commentator observes, is
that the Cabinet lacks the “objectivity and expertise” of the Board; “[s]hifting the
decision for major energy projects from the Board to Cabinet will politicize what

142. Supra note 57 at 293.
143. Bruce Pardy, “In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the
Problem” (2005) 1:1 JSDLP 29.
144. See also Ruhl, supra note 46.
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was an otherwise independent regulatory process.”145 But the Board, just like the
Cabinet, necessarily exercises significant policy-making discretion that cannot
be eliminated through objective expertise. Simply put, delegating environmental
decision-making authority to an independent expert does not, without more,
respond to the environmental reform position’s concern about discretion.
Independent expert decision makers play a significant role in environmental
decision making. As we have already seen, British Columbia’s Chief Forester
implemented one of the province’s key responses to the mountain pine beetle
epidemic by increasing the allowable harvest in areas affected by the epidemic.
The Chief Forester exercises considerable discretion in determining the allowable
annual cut for all regions of the province, and, “[o]f all the decisions facing forest
policymakers, [this one is] probably the most critical in terms of its economic
importance … .”146 But to reconcile the Chief Forester’s broad discretion with the
formal conception of the rule of law, we must assume that objective expertise can
provide the constraints on discretion that the legislature is unable to provide.147
From this perspective, objective expertise means that the decision maker is not
exercising discretion in any real sense. Rather, an independent decision maker is
simply doing what the legislature, or indeed anyone, would do if they possessed
the requisite knowledge.148
These assumptions are unsound, but they have a strong footing in the history
of Canadian environmental law. Indeed, the office of the Chief Forester was
originally conceived on the basis of these assumptions. The Chief Forester was “a
first-class, scientific man, thoroughly well qualified, who has had both technical
and practical training and experience.”149 The legislature delegated a task that it
145. Ecojustice, “Legal Backgrounder: The National Energy Board Act 1985” (September
2012), online: <www.ecojustice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SEPT-2012_FINAL_
NEBA-backgrounder.pdf>.
146. The Royal Commission on Forest Resources, Timber Rights and Forest Policy In British
Columbia (Victoria, BC: The Commission, 1976) vol 1(Peter H Pearse) at 219, online:
<www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/pubs/Docs/Mr/Rc/Rc006/Rc006.pdf> [Pearse].
147. James M Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1938)
at 25-26. See also John Willis, “Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial,
the Conceptual, and the Functional” (1935) 1:1 UTLJ 53 at 75-81 (Willis’s functionalist
approach emphasizes expediency and the role of expertise, though he does not deny the
necessity of administrative discretion).
148. Richard B Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law” (1975) 88:8 Harv
L Rev 1667 at 1678; Mark Seidenfeld, “The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the
Administrative State” (2013) 81:5 Geo Wash L Rev 1397 at 1404.
149. British Columbia, Final Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Timber and Forestry
1909-1910 (Victoria, BC: Richard Wolfenden, King’s Printer, 1910) (Fred J Fulton) at 67,
online: <www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/pubs/Docs/Mr/Rc/Rc002/Rc002.pdf>.
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could not do itself: The Chief Forester was to consolidate and synthesize the vast
information on the province’s forests in order to act “in all matters affecting the
forest interests of the Province.”150 The Chief Forester applied this expertise to
determine the rate of harvesting that would maximize long-term timber yield
through a technical process known as the Hanzlik formula.151 The determination
appeared to turn on purely factual questions—the rate of forest growth, the
amount of forest mature enough to harvest, and the area accessible to loggers
for harvesting.152 The decision-making authority of the Chief Forester, therefore,
appeared consistent with the formal conception of the rule of law because the
Chief Forester retained a purely instrumental and technical role in using objective
expertise to carry out the democratic mandate of the legislature.
The assumption that the independent expert applies solely objective expertise
contains two further assumptions: first, that independent decision makers deal
only with factual matters153—not political or policy judgments—and second,
that these factual matters can be resolved in a way that points to one objective
outcome. The latter assumption is flatly refuted by the environmental emergency,
as we have seen with the mountain pine beetle example. Moreover, there is no
objective way to deal with this kind of uncertainty154 because complex, adaptive
systems are replete with poorly understood relationships and incomplete data,
often making their management more an exercise of “speculation”155 than
objective analysis. Even seemingly factual issues, such as determining the rotation

150. Ibid at 68.
151. Larry Pedersen, “Allowable Annual Cuts in British Columbia: The Agony and the Ecstasy”
(UBC Faculty of Forestry Jubilee Lecture delivered at the Faculty of Forestry, University of
British Columbia, 20 March 2003) at 4, online: <www.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/pubs/jubilee_ubc.
pdf>. The Hanzlik formula is as follows: sustained annual yield = mature timber above
rotation age/rotation age + mean annual increment for immature timber.
152. Lois H Dellert, “Sustained Yield: Why Has it Failed to Achieve Sustainability?” in Chris
Tollefson, ed, The Wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation, and Sustainable Forestry (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 1998) 255 at 257.
153. Henry S Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 115.
154. This is the main thesis of Kysar. See Kysar, Regulating, supra note 50.
155. Pearse, supra note 146 at 232.
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age for harvesting, in fact turn on further assumptions about the future.156
In short, accurate forestry inventories are necessary but not sufficient to determine
the desired rate of timber harvest since the Chief Forester will have to make
discretionary judgments on a whole host of uncertain factors.
The Chief Forester’s prominent position in directing British Columbian
forest policy further undermines the assumption that independent experts
deal only with factual matters and not political judgments. In this respect, the
Chief Forester’s determination of the allowable annual cut is significant for
what it does not include. Even now, long after the Hanzlik formula has faded
into the background, the allowable annual cut is still dictated by a policy of
maximizing sustained yield. Maximum sustainable yield includes the value of
timber; it does not account for the myriad other benefits that forests provide—
for example, hunting, grazing, water quality regulation, biodiversity, and carbon
sequestration. Calls to incorporate these non-timber values into the maximum
sustained yield model have gone largely unheeded,157 evidencing the difficulty
of incorporating inherently discretionary decisions involving incommensurable
trade-offs into a technical model of decision-making premised on an assumption
of objective expertise.
In short, delegating environmental decisions to independent experts does
not resolve the challenge that environmental issues pose to governing through
law. Independent expert decision makers exercise considerable discretion that
cannot be fully constrained by objective expertise. Moreover, an assumption of
objective expertise risks creating a similar kind of façade that Schmitt argues exists
in the emergency context. Layers of technical analysis that appear to constrain the
substantive outcomes of decision making in fact require the exercise of significant
discretion over what inputs to include in the technocratic calculation.158 Indeed,
156. In a royal commission on the regulation of timber harvest, three experts disagreed on the
rotation age, with proposals ranging from 60 to 120 years. See Report of the Commissioner
relating to The Forest Resources of British Columbia (Victoria, BC: Don McDiarmid, Queen’s
Printer, 1956) vol 1 (Gordon McG Sloan) at 236, 241, online: <www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/
pubs/Docs/Mr/Rc/Rc004/Rc004.pdf>. Moreover, a recent groundbreaking scientific study
challenges the long held assumption that aging trees have slower growth rates. See NL
Stephenson et al, “Rate of tree carbon accumulation increases continuously with tree size,”
Letter, (2014) 507:7490 Nature 90.
157. Dellert, supra note 152. There has always been unwavering faith that better modelling
techniques and more data will respond to criticism. See Pearse, supra note 146 at 233. See
also British Columbia, Forest Resources Commission, The Future of Our Forests (Victoria,
BC: Forest Resources Commission, 1991) (AL (Sandy) Peel) at 75, online: <www.for.gov.
bc.ca/hfd/pubs/Docs/Mr/Rc/Rc001/Rc001.pdf>.
158. Kysar, Regulating, supra note 50 at 72.
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the Chief Forester’s approach to determining the annual harvest was criticized on
this very basis by forest commentators who observed that “[r]egardless of which
formula or model was used, from the 1950s to the 1990s, economic forces caused
the annual harvest to increase, in spite of the original expectation of reductions in
the harvest.”159 Far from constraining administrative discretion, in other words,
technical forest analyses were in fact capacious frameworks in which decision
makers could covertly succumb to industry pressure. Independent expert decision
makers alone cannot, therefore, provide an answer to the environmental reform
position’s problem with discretion.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE RULE OF LAW

Understanding environmental issues as an ongoing emergency reveals the limits
of the formal conception of the rule of law. It also directs us to an alternative
understanding of the rule of law, one that accounts for the inevitability and
desirability of administrative discretion and has the potential to ensure that
discretionary environmental decisions are subject to rule-of-law constraints. This
section turns to the theory of common law constitutionalism, which understands
“the constraints of law as the constraints of adequate justification”160 and
requires that public officials justify their decisions on the basis of fundamental
constitutional principles. As we will see, the requirement of public justification
can be maintained in emergencies and thus holds great potential for responding to
the environmental emergency. Moreover, the environmental emergency contains
important insights for common law constitutionalism because it highlights the
need for significant institutional innovation across a broad range of administrative
contexts to ensure that the requirement of public justification can be fulfilled.
1.

THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION

The observation that discretionary environmental decisions still seem to be
governed by the formal conception of the rule of law is significant not only for
environmental protection but also because Canadian judges have largely moved
away from a formal conception of the rule of law. This transition, usually marked

159. GF Utzig & DL Macdonald, Citizens’ Guide to Allowable Annual Cut Determinations: How
to Make a Difference (Vancouver: Kutenai Nature Investigations for BC Environmental
Network Educational Foundation, 2000) at 6.
160. Dyzenhaus, “Justification,” supra note 16.
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by the watershed Supreme Court of Canada decisions in CUPE161 and Nicholson162
in 1979 and continuing to this day, has been a product of the judiciary’s growing
acceptance of the legitimacy of the administrative state. The strongest signal of
this move is the Court’s repeated endorsement of a concept of deference as respect,
which first appeared in Baker,163 in which the majority effectively articulated a
requirement of public justification.
Baker concerned the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration’s refusal to
exempt from deportation a woman who had illegally overstayed in Canada.
The legislation and regulations delegated seemingly unfettered discretion to
the Minister to grant an exemption “if satisfied” that one should be granted
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. For the majority, however, this
language did not mean that the Minister operated in a space uncontrolled by
law. Rather, the majority found that the Minister’s “discretion must be exercised
with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the
principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and
the principles of the Charter.”164
But to determine whether discretion was exercised in this manner, the
majority had to impose a requirement to give reasons,165 which allowed the Court
to meaningfully assess whether the decision was reasonable in the sense of reflecting
these fundamental legal principles. Under this understanding of the rule of law,
decision makers were not owed deference simply because of their institutional
expertise or because they complied with the formal requirements of their enabling
statute. Rather, they were owed deference when their decisions were justified. In
other words, deference “requires not submission but a respectful attention to the
reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision.”166 On this
view, administrative discretion is not an illegitimate space uncontrolled by law
but is rather legitimate and worthy of judicial respect when exercised in a manner
that reflects the fundamental legal principles alluded to in Baker.

161. CUPE v NB Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 SCR 227, 97 DLR (3d) 417 [CUPE].
162. Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners, [1979] 1 SCR 311, 88 DLR
(3d) 671 [Nicholson].
163. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 65,
1 Imm LR (3d) 1 [Baker], citing David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial
Review and Democracy,” in M Taggart, ed, The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1997) 279 at 286 [Dyzenhaus, “Politics”].
164. Baker, supra note 163 at para 56.
165. Ibid at para 43.
166. Ibid at para 65, citing Dyzenhaus, “Politics,” supra note 163 at 286.
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The majority’s reasons in Baker reflect a competing conception of the rule
of law that imposes a requirement on public officials to publicly justify their
decisions.167 From this perspective, the rule of law is not “the rule of rules,”168
as Schmitt would understand it, but is rather, first and foremost, the realization
of constitutional principles. Administrative decisions have legal authority when
they reflect these constitutional principles.169 Dyzenhaus argues that these
constitutional principles are those that form the foundation of administrative
law exemplified in Baker—fairness, equality, and reasonableness170—and that are
necessary to “protect the individual from arbitrary state action.”171 Reason-giving
is essential to this conception of the rule of law because decision makers discharge
their duty of justification by offering public reasons.172 Reasons ensure that the
individual knows that he or she has not been treated arbitrarily by the state. They
also ensure that the institutions of government can hold one another to account
when they fall short in their commitment to the rule of law. Judicial review is
one way to ensure that administrative decision makers meet their requirement of
public justification. But it also requires that judges defer—that is, not substitute
their own views—when the decision is justified on the basis of fairness, of
equality, and of reasonableness.173
The Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to the requirement of public
justification has been imperfect, to be sure. As we have seen, the formal conception
still emerges and often conflicts with the common law constitutional conception
of the rule of law. Even in the immigration context, the court has retreated from
the majority’s decision in Baker. In both Suresh,174 a post-9/11 national security
decision, and more recently Khosa,175 it stated that reviewing courts should only
ensure that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration considered the correct
factors when assessing whether an individual should be granted “special relief ”
from a removal order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds and “should
not reweigh them.”176 In other words, the Court allowed the Minister free rein in
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Dyzenhaus, “Justification,” supra note 16 at 30.
Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 336.
Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 7.
Ibid at 12-13; Evan J Criddle, “Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law” (2010)
104:3 Nw UL Rev 1271 at 1276.
Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 2. See also TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A
Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 38-39.
Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 139.
Ibid at 147.
Suresh, supra note 81.
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 SCR 339 [Khosa].
Suresh, supra note 81 at para 41. See also Khosa, supra note 175 at para 61.
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how to account for these factors. So long as the Minister ticked the appropriate
boxes, the Court refused to second-guess the Minister’s exercise of discretion.177
Moreover, there was no hint in either decision of the non-statutory principles
identified by the majority in Baker.178
The Court’s important attempt in Dunsmuir179 to set straight the principles
of administrative law also reflected conflicting conceptions of the rule of law.180
The majority reasserted its monopoly over some formal categories of decisions:
constitutional questions and true questions of vires, for example.181 But it still
urged courts to take a contextual approach to determining the appropriate
standard of review182 and reiterated that, in cases in which deference was owed,
the court’s role was to ensure “the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process.”183 Since Dunsmuir, however,
the Court’s formalistic inclinations have waned again in some respects. The
Court has since deferred to administrative decision makers on issues that fall
squarely within traditional judicial strongholds, including a constitutional
question,184 the application of the common law doctrine of estoppel,185 and the
breach of a statutory deadline, which would have conventionally been labelled
a true question of vires.186 Indeed, the Court has suggested that the concept of a
true question of vires, the very basis on which a formalist judge justifies judicial
review, may have been a fiction after all,187 thus sending the clear message that the
Court has accepted the legitimacy of the administrative state.
Moreover, the Court has recently restated its position in Baker that there is
no such thing as unfettered discretion.188 It is noteworthy that this clear statement
was made with respect to a municipal by-law—delegated legislation issued by a
177. Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2011) at 228-29, n 95.
178. Ibid.
179. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].
180. Lewans, supra note 130 at 74.
181. Dunsmuir, supra note 179 at paras 58-59.
182. Ibid at para 64.
183. Ibid at para 47.
184. Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395.
185. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals,
2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 SCR 616.
186. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61,
[2011] 3 SCR 654 [Teachers’]. See also Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human
Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 SCR 364 (where the Court again distanced
itself from the concept of a jurisdictional question).
187. Teachers’, supra note 186 at para 34.
188. Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at para 24, [2012] 1 SCR 5.
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democratically elected decision maker. Yet a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada
found that this decision was subject to the supervision of the courts because
“[t]he fact that wide deference is owed to municipal councils does not mean they
have carte blanche.”189 In fact, the Court observed that the “attempt to maintain a
clear line between policy and legality has not prevailed.”190 The Court reasserted
its supervisory role to ensure that, in passing delegated legislation, a municipality
adheres to both procedural and substantive requirements of legality.191
While there is much work to be done to elaborate upon the requirements
of public justification in environmental law, a “symbolic”192 Federal Court
decision offers some hope that this conception of the rule of law is taking root
in Canadian environmental assessment. In finding the environmental assessment
of the proposed Darlington nuclear power project unreasonable, the court in
Greenpeace Canada v Canada (Attorney General) reasoned that the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act sets out a process “that is, when it functions
properly, both evidence-based and democratically accountable.”193 The court held
that it must pay particular attention to the reasons offered by the review panel
because “the element of ‘justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process’ takes on a heightened importance” in the context of
environmental assessment.194 It thus imposed a robust requirement of public
justification on the review panel.
Martin Olszynski describes this decision as a welcome, albeit belated,
acknowledgment of the proper role of environmental assessment. Properly
understood, environmental assessment enables democratic accountability
by informing the public whether a project will result in significant adverse
189. Ibid.
190. Ibid at para 14.
191. Ibid at para 16. Remarkably, the Court seems to impose a requirement of procedural fairness
without addressing the category of “legislative functions.” This decision is difficult to square
with its later decision in Katz, which affirms that regulations can only be reviewed for vires.
See Katz, supra note 108.
192. Martin Olszynski, “Environmental Assessment as Planning and Disclosure Tool: Greenpeace
Canada v Canada (Attorney General) 2014 FC 463” (2015) Dal L J [forthcoming].
193. 2014 FC 463 at para 237, 87 CELR (3d) 173 [Greenpeace]. Unfortunately, a majority of
the Federal Court of Appeal overturned this decision in Ontario Power Generation Inc. v
Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 186. It reverted to the formal conception of the rule of
law, which upheld the environmental assessment as reasonable because there was “some
consideration” of the project’s environmental effects (at para 130). The dissenting judge
would have upheld the Federal Court’s approach.
194. Greenpeace, supra note 193 at para 272, citing Dunsmuir, supra note 179 at para 47; Khosa,
supra note 175 at para 59 [citations omitted].
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environmental effects. The electorate is then equipped with the information
needed to hold the elected officials of Cabinet to account for approving the
project.195 Olszynski rightly points out that the direction of the reasons in an
environmental assessment is to the public (rather than simply to the Cabinet).196
Indeed, environmental assessment, understood in this sense, exemplifies how
compliance with the rule of law goes hand-in-hand with democratic accountability.
In contrast to the formal conception of the rule of law, the requirement of
public justification makes democratic values internal to the rule of law itself.197
It embodies the democratic values of participation and accountability and enables
citizens to understand, deliberate about, and contest public decisions.
2.

INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTATION

Common law constitutionalism frees the rule of law from the confines of a
strict doctrine of the separation of powers. The separation of powers, like any
institutional design, is only useful to the extent that it enables the realization of
foundational constitutional principles.198 This purposive understanding of the
separation of powers, Dyzenhaus argues, allows the requirement of justification to
be fulfilled even in times of crisis when government claims of secrecy and national
security interfere with judicial scrutiny of emergency response decisions.199 For
example, Dyzenhaus points to a special immigration appeals tribunal in the
United Kingdom in charge of reviewing deportation decisions that, but for
sensitive information pertaining to national security, would be reviewed by the
court.200 The tribunal has expertise in national security, in immigration, and in
law and has special powers to allow government claims of secrecy to be tested in

195. Olszynski, supra note 192.
196. This would also be the case for the “justification” for a project approval in the face of
significant adverse environmental effects. See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012,
SC 2012, c 19, s 52. See also Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, s 37.
This act was at issue in Greenpeace. See Greenpeace, supra note 193. To be clear, however,
from the perspective of common law constitutionalism, the direction of the reasons is to the
public, not because of the statutory language, but because it is the public that will be affected
by the decision, and therefore its interests need to be reflected in the decision.
197. Dyzenhaus, “Justification,” supra note 16 at 34.
198. David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative
Law” (2002) 27:2 Queen’s LJ 445 at 451 [Dyzenhaus, “Values”].
199. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 174-90.
200. Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK), c 68, s 2.
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closed proceedings.201 To be sure, the procedures are far from perfect,202 but they
can be understood as a commitment to public justification. The tribunal ensures
that the executive’s deportation decision is justified, and in turn the court ensures
that the tribunal’s decision is justified.203 The court must also justify its decision
on the basis of fundamental common law principles.204 Thus, judicial review
need not be conceived of as an all-or-nothing endeavour in which judges are
torn between abdicating their role or second-guessing national security decisions.
Rather, it can be understood as playing a more nuanced role in which the court
ensures that other institutions of government are maintaining their commitment
to the rule of law,205 understood as a requirement to justify decisions publicly on
the basis of core constitutional principles.
Dyzenhaus’s example of how institutional experimentation can ensure that
the requirement of justification can be fulfilled in emergencies holds important
potential for understanding how the rule of law can respond to the environmental
emergency. While analogous environmental appeal tribunals are common in
Canadian environmental law,206 there is much potential for environmental issues
to contribute to a far-reaching elaboration of common law constitutionalism.
Outside the adjudicative context, Dyzenhaus gestures towards the American

201. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 163.
202. Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB, [2006] EWCA Civ 1140. Sullivan J
(overturned by the Court of Appeal) described the special advocates procedure as creating a
“thin veneer of legality.” See Re MB, Admin, supra note 87 at para 103. Numerous lawyers
acting as special advocates and representing the claimant’s interests in the closed proceedings
have quit because of the inadequacy of the process. See Clare Dyer, “Terror QC: more will
quit special court,” The Guardian (20 December 2004), online: <www.theguardian.com/
politics/2004/dec/20/terrorism.humanrights>.
203. Dyzenhaus, Constitution, supra note 14 at 178. Dyzenhaus makes clear that his is an
aspirational account, since the role of judicial review that he describes is one with which
judges tend to struggle.
204. Dyzenhaus, “Values,” supra note 198 at 501-502.
205. See also Sossin, supra note 140 at 687.
206. See e.g. Jerry V DeMarco & Paul Muldoon, Environmental Boards and Tribunals in
Canada: A Practical Guide (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011); Mark Haddock,
“Environmental Tribunals in British Columbia” (January 2011), online: Environmental Law
Centre <www.elc.uvic.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Environmental-Tribunalsin-BC_Feb2011.pdf>. Their mandates, procedures, and functions are diverse; thus, the
extent to which any given tribunal is capable of fulfilling the requirement of justification
depends on its specific context. Common criticisms include: there is limited standing for
parties that are not the regulated party; licensing decisions are only appealable at time of
initial issue, not when licences are amended or renewed; and entire environmental statutes or
public interest perspectives fall outside the scope of existing institutions (ibid at 23, 26-27).
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example of the notice-and-comment process for administrative rule making207
as an illustration of procedures that promote the culture of justification.208
Notice-and-comment procedures require administrative agencies to provide
public notice of proposed regulations, solicit public comment, and issue a
rationale statement that reflects consideration of public comments and offers
a public-regarding justification for the decision.209 The procedure embodies the
values of participation and accountability by ensuring that the decision-making
process is both open and responsive to the broader political community, not
simply the narrower range of parties and interests that would be represented in
an adjudication.
Despite its technocratic origins, the Chief Forester’s process for determining
the allowable harvest now incorporates notice-and-comment requirements. The
results of a technical review are made accessible to the public and form the basis
for public comment.210 After two rounds of public comment and Aboriginal
consultation, the Chief Forester makes the final determination211 and publishes
a rationale statement detailing his or her reasons for the decision.212 Although
the process was abridged in some cases at the height of the mountain pine beetle
epidemic, the basic elements of notice, of public comment, and of reasons for the
Chief Forester’s decision remained intact.213
Perhaps a more interesting example of how institutional design can
maintain public justification in the complex environmental context is British
207.
208.
209.
210.

5 USC § 553 (2011).
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213. British Columbia, Ministry of Forests, Prince George Timber Supply Area: Rationale for
Allowable Annual Cut (AAC) Determination, by Larry Pederson, Chief Forester (September
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Ministry of Forests and Range, Morice Timber Supply Area: Rationale for Allowable Annual
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and Range, Williams Lake Timber Supply Area: Rationale for Allowable Annual Cut (AAC)
Determination, by Jim Snetsinger, Chief Forester (April 2007), online: <www.for.gov.bc.ca/
hts/tsa/tsa29/tsr3/29ts07ra.pdf>; British Columbia, Ministry of Forests and Range, 100
Mile House Timber Supply Area: Rationale for Allowable Annual Cut (AAC) Determination, by
Jim Snetsinger, Chief Forester (September 2006), online: <www.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/tsa/tsa23/
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Columbia’s Forest Practices Board. The Board is the province’s independent
“forestry watchdog.”214 It exercises a range of specialized functions including the
execution of comprehensive and systematic reviews of broader issues of forest
policy. Its scope of review is therefore not limited by the typical constraints of
an adjudicatory hearing in which the decision maker resolves a narrow dispute
between two adversarial parties. Its members have expertise in forestry, in biology,
and in law and the Board’s purpose is to promote accountability within the forest
sector by overseeing both government enforcement of and industry compliance
with the Forest and Range Practices Act.215 The Board has a variety of statutory
powers including auditing, responding to complaints, and initiating internal
reviews or appeals of government decisions.216 In addition, the Board is charged
with the task of conducting comprehensive special investigations into matters of
public importance.217
The Forest Practices Board conducted a series of special investigations
of the government’s response to the mountain pine beetle epidemic and, in
doing so, demonstrated its ability to thoroughly vet the government’s claims
that exceptional emergency response actions were necessary to respond to the
epidemic. For example, the government based its initial response to the beetle
epidemic on the assumption that aggressively clear-cutting infested stands and the
surrounding area could control and suppress the epidemic. The Board reviewed
this assumption and determined that, although it was reasonable and did have a
modest effect on the epidemic, the better approach in heavily-attacked forests was
to switch to salvage harvesting.218 The government changed its harvest strategy in
accordance with the Board’s recommendation.219 Moreover, the Board has played
an important role in exposing the many ecological impacts of the mountain pine
beetle response, such as the effects of heavy salvage logging on stream flows and

214. British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly
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218. Forest Practices Board, Evaluating, supra note 38 at 33.
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biodiversity.220 It has also contributed to assuaging public concerns that industry
had opportunistically over-harvested unaffected tree species.221
In short, a common law constitutional conception of the rule of law
emphasizes creative institutional design to ensure that all government decisions
can be publicly justified. Many examples of creative institutional design are
already in place in Canadian environmental law, but assessing the extent to which
they can—and do—fulfill this conception of the rule of law is a pressing and
much larger task. The fact that environmental law remains mired in the formal
conception suggests that these aspects of institutional design have been largely
undervalued from the perspective of maintaining the rule of law.222

IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that understanding the nature of the relationship between
law and the environment requires viewing environmental issues as an ongoing
emergency. It argued that environmental issues possess the constitutive features
of an emergency: They contain the ineliminable possibility of an unforeseeable,
catastrophic threat. The environmental emergency does not offer a solution to any
or all environmental issues, perhaps least of all the mountain pine beetle epidemic.
Rather, it is a way of understanding how environmental decision making can
better align with our commitment to democratic values and the rule of law.
This framework of the environmental emergency no doubt raises more
questions than it answers. Acknowledging the potential of institutional design is
only the first step in articulating how the common law constitutional conception
of the rule of law can be fulfilled in environmental law. With common law
constitutionalism’s focus on the adjudicative context, it is not immediately
clear that its core principles of fairness, equality, and reasonableness can find
220. Forest Practices Board, The Effect of Mountain Pine Beetle Attack and Salvage Harvesting on
Streamflows: Special Investigation (March 2007), online: <www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/library/
documents/bib106689.pdf>; Forest Practices Board, Biodiversity Conservation during Salvage
Logging in the Central Interior of BC: Special Report (November 2009), online: <www.bcfpb.
ca/sites/default/files/reports/SR35%20-%20Salvage%20Logging%20v3FINAL.pdf>.
221. Forest Practices Board, Tree Species Harvested In Areas Affected By Mountain Pine
Beetles: Special Report (November 2007), online: <www.bcfpb.ca/sites/default/files/
reports/SR33.pdf>.
222. See e.g. Western Canada Wilderness Committee v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural
Resource Operations), 2014 BCSC 808, 240 ACWS (3d) 745. Despite concluding that the
Forest Practices Board is the appropriate forum for review, it was held that the Minister’s
decision was legally valid. The court, in other words, completely undermines the distinctive
role that the Board plays in upholding the requirement of public justification.
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the same expression in the primarily administrative context of environmental
decision making.223 The environmental emergency highlights the importance of
this next task of determining what common law constitutionalism requires in
the policy-laden context of environmental law.224 One promising avenue is the
overlap between Dyzenhaus’s requirement of public justification and the right
to justification derived from theories of deliberative democracy.225 Indeed, the
central tenets of deliberative democracy—including consensus, reason, and
equality—serve the same underlying democratic values of participation and
accountability as the common law constitutional conception of the rule of
law.226 And the potential for theories of deliberative democracy to better orient
administrative policy making towards these democratic values has already been
noted in other contexts.227 Redefining environmental law through the framework
of the environmental emergency opens up these new avenues for understanding
the role of law in the governance of environmental decision making while,
at the same time, keeping in plain sight the profound challenges that serious
environmental issues pose for the rule of law.
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